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Section 1. Introduction 
 
  From the perspective of the late 1930s and 1940s, the dominant view was that the 
inter-war experience was a financial disaster.  This view is perfectly encapsulated in the 
League of Nations’ publication The Inter-war Currency Experience, the bulk of which 
was written by Ragnar Nurkse, published in 1944 and in the League’s parallel 1945 
publication, Economic Stability in the Post-War World.  It also was the view behind the 
Keynes and White plans for international monetary reform, which culminated in the 
Bretton Woods conference. 
  According to this view: 
-  the floating exchange rate experience of the 1920s was marked by destabilizing 
speculation and instability 
-  the gold exchange standard did not work because it unilaterally imposed 
deflationary adjustment on deficit countries while surplus countries sterilized gold 
inflows, and because of a wrong choice of exchange rates after World War I, and 
because of a general shortage of gold   3
-  short term capital flows (“hot money movements”) were destructive in the 1930s 
-  competitive devaluations in the 1930s (“beggar-thy-neighbor”) were counter-
productive 
-  all these factors destroyed the multilateral payments system and a movement 
toward bilateralism and autarky (“Schachtianism”), and the breakdown of 
international trade played an important role in the origins of the Second World 
War. 
This perception of events led to the case for capital controls and an adjustable peg, or 
parities that could be altered in the case of fundamental disequilbrium.  What would now 
be known as the “corner solutions” of gold standard rigid fixing or floating rates were 
rejected. The gold standard was criticized because it subordinated domestic goals such as 
full employment or price stability to external stability. Capital controls were required to 
prevent destabilizing speculation and to allow some degree of domestic policy autonomy.  
An international financial authority was needed to prevent harmful interactions between 
different national policies, or to further coordination of economic policy. 
  The Bretton Woods system was established , but it was only in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s that the major industrial countries made the transition to current account 
convertibility.  It rapidly unraveled, because countries found it hard to identify 
fundamental disequilibria, or to change exchange rates.  In the meantime, the exchange 
rate offered a nice target for speculation, which capital controls were in practice unable to 
control.  As the U.S. provided the reserve center for the system, and as claims against the 
U.S. built up, the U.S. became the subject of possible speculative attacks.  The clearly 
visible defects of the Bretton Woods system led to a case for generalized floating, a case   4
which in fact had already been made in 1953 by Milton Friedman.
1 By 1973, generalized 
floating provided the basis for a new system or non-system in international monetary 
relations. 
  Modern economic historians view the experience of the 1920s and 1930s 
differently.
2  Exchange rate instability reflected destabilizing monetary and fiscal policies.  
Competitive devaluations were less disruptive to trade than was believed, and the 
fundamental problems came from high tariff levels and above all from quotas. The case 
of French floating in the 1920s was the outcome of political dissension about appropriate 
fiscal policy, and British floating in the 1930s was a clear success.  Capital flows 
reflected underlying fundamentals, in which inconsistent policy mixes produced 
incredible policies that made currencies vulnerable to speculative attacks. The exchange 
rate system provided a mechanism for the transmission of monetary shocks. 
  Could there have been an alternative route to 1973? A strong intellectual case for 
floating had already been made earlier than 1953, in the work of Gottfried Haberler.  He 
argued that a floating exchange rate could insulate countries from the transmission of 
booms and depressions.  His view is a clear predecessor to the open economy Fleming-
Mundell model. 
  Why was Haberler’s analysis not taken more seriously at the time of the wartime 
discussions of a postwar monetary system.  In part the answer is that Haberler was an 
analyst not an advocate, moreover he believed that the interwar experience with 
devaluation and floating was unsatisfactory because floating was associated with 
                                                 
1 Friedman’s “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” first appeared in a memorandum written in Paris in 
1950. Others also advocated floating in this period, e.g. Emminger, Sohmen and British officials in the 
ROBOT plan. Canada’s successful shift to floating in 1950 became a focal point for their view.   5
destabilizing speculation. In part the answer is that his approach was viewed as 
anachronistic since it did not follow the Keynesian lead; and in part the 1930s was in the 
grip of a real terror about capital movements because they were so clearly and intimately 
associated with political crises. Indeed, in 1945, even Haberler subscribed to the Nurkse-
Bretton Woods consensus. 
  Section 2 examines the views of Nurkse and the Bretton Woods mainstream. 
Section 3 develops Haberler’s analysis in the 1930s of the transmission of business cycles 
under fixed and floating rates and considers why, although he presented the case for 
floating, he was not an advocate.   Section 4 looks at the resistance to Haberler’s analysis 
of floating in the League of Nations and elsewhere. Section 5 concludes with a discussion 
of Haberler’s postwar advocacy of the case for generalized floating, his critique of the 
adjustable peg and his reinterpretation of the events of the interwar. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Bordo (1993), pp. 30 – 31.   6
Section 2. Ragnar Nurkse and the Bretton Woods Consensus 
 
  The League of Nations, and in particular its Economic and Financial 
Organization, had played a major role in international economic relations in the 1920s. In 
the 1930s, however, the League was under attack. As a peacekeeper, it was undermined 
by its failures in regard to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia, by the absence of the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the Nazi 
decision to leave the League and unilaterally pursue rearmament. In economic matters, 
the credibility of the League was undermined by the failure of the London World 
Economic Conference of 1933 (Clavin 1996). None of the suggestions for a tariff truce or 
for monetary stabilization seemed to stand much chance of success. 
  The League retreated into discussions of policy that might be appropriate in a 
national setting. In October 1937, it initiated a large scale inquiry into “measures which 
might be employed with a view to the prevention and mitigation of economic 
depressions.” As part of this exercise, it initiated a series of discussions between a large 
number of prominent economists, which eventually resulted in the publication of a 
blueprint for a new economic order under the title Economic Stability in the Post-War 
World (1945). 
  Most of these discussions, and the book that Haberler had previously written for 
the League on Prosperity and Depression had their major emphasis on national policy, 
and not on international monetary arrangements. A League official, Pietro Stoppani, 
wrote that:  
   7
“During recent years the type of work undertaken by the Economic  and  Financial 
Organization of the League has undergone a rather striking development. Political 
and   economic   circumstances   have   rendered   difficult    the    conclusions   of 
conventions  and  multilateral  agreements  …  This  state  of  affairs  has  led   the 
Economic and Financial Organisation to concentrate increasingly on the  study  of 
problems  common  to  all  countries  as  distinct  from  problems  of  international 
economic relations. The method which has been adopted has been that  of  expert, 
scientific  enquiry  into  particular  problems  with  which  states  are   faced   both 
internally and in their relations with other states.”
3 
 
  During the War, however, it became clear that an examination of international 
monetary issues would be critical for the making of the postwar settlement, and the 
League Economic and Financial Organization set about preparing a survey of interwar 
currency experience. That work was mostly written by Ragnar Nurkse. 
  It is worth thinking about Nukse’s personal trajectory. Nurkse was born in Estonia 
of an Estonian father and Swedish mother, but his family emigrated to Canada and he 
stidued in Edinburgh and then in (crucially) Vienna, where he worked with the major 
figures of the Austrian school – Haberler, Hayek, Machlup, Mises and Morgenstern. 
Vienna was crucial; not only was it the center of a tradition of economics; but with the 
Creditandsalt collapse of 1931, it provided the epicenter of the world financial crisis. At a 
critical time for Nurkse, with the experience of banking and currency crises of 1931, 
capital flight appeared as the pressing issue for contemporary economics. Machlup in 
                                                 
3 LoN R4459, Stoppani, “Note Regarding the Possibilities of International Action in Economic Matters.”   8
1932 in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv published a paper in which he examined how capital 
flight contributed to banking collapses as well as to obvious balance of payments 
difficulties, in that in order to make movements across the exchanges, speculators 
withdrew deposits from banks and endangered the banking systems. If central banks tried 
to compensate with increased liquidity for such withdrawals, they lost reserves and their 
exchange rate was endangered. Governments reacted with exchange controls, “police 
measures, penal sanctions and confiscation” which diminished the propensity to save, to 
invest capital, and added to the “psychological roots of capital flight.”
4 
  Nurkse’s first article was on the “Causes and Effects of Capital Movements”, 
which became the basis for a book published in 1935. In the meantime he had moved to 
Geneva to a post in the League of Nations Financial Section, which moved from Geneva 
to Princeton during the War. At first he worked closely with Gottfried Haberler in Geneva 
too. In Princeton he was part of a team of distinguished economists including J.B. 
Condliffe, Marcus Fleming, Folke Hilgerdt, Jacques Polak, and Louis Rasminsky. 
  His major work in Princeton involved the preparation of a League Publication 
which was circulated in roneographed form to the delegations arriving in the summer of 
1944 for the preliminary meeting at Atlantic City that prepared the agenda for the United 
Nations Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods. Except for Chapter VI (on Exchange 
Stabilization Funds) this book, International Currency Experience: Lessons from the 
Inter-War Period, was written by Nurkse, although it was extensively commented on by 
members of what had become the League’s “Economic, Financial, and Transit 
Department”, and in particular by the director of the department Alexander Loveday. 
                                                 
4 Machlup (1932), p. 527.   9
  That book distilled a series of lessons from the interwar experience that lay behind 
the Bretton Woods solution. There is actually a strong personal link between the League, 
its lessons, and the new order. Indeed Nurkse was offered a senior position in the 
institutions created at Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund, which he turned 
down to take a chair in Columbia University; but a number of his colleagues at the 
League did go to the IMF. Some of them – especially Polak – saw the IMF as a 
continuation and extension of the experience and work of the interwar League. 
  According to Nurkse’s interpretation, the circumstances of postwar reconstruction 
after the First World War held some crucial lessons for what should be avoided after the 
Second. In particular: 
1.  Much of the instability of the 1920s stemmed from the exchange rate 
depreciations at the beginning of the decade. At first depreciations in the 
continental European economies stimulated the economies, by creating price 
advantages for export industries. Since the depreciated rates were believed to 
be temporary they attracted capital inflows. But as depreciation continued, and 
the prospect of a return to pre-war gold standard parities looked less and less 
likely, the advantages disappeared. Wages rapidly adjusted to depreciation and 
removed the cost advantage for exports. A “cumulative process of capital 
flight” began. Nurkse concluded that “exchange depreciation was a fitful and 
unreliable method of attracting foreign funds to replenish the national working 
capital, a method depending on the interplay of speculative anticipations” 
(115). The French franc in the 1920s offered a particularly intense example of   10
how freely fluctuating rates could not be maintained “on an even keel” (119) 
but tended to overshoot. 
2.  When currencies were eventually stabilized in the mid-1920s, they were 
stabilized at the wrong levels. Again, this result had been produced by the 
perverse effects of capital movements. “The rates at which exchanges were 
fixed had been reached frequently under the influence of abnormal short-term 
movements with the result that some currencies were overvalued and others 
undervalued … The two most familiar but by no means the only sources of 
disequilibrium arose from the successive stabilization of the pound sterling 
and the French franc early in 1925 and late in 1936 respectively, the one at too 
high and the other at too low a level in relation to domestic costs and prices.” 
(116-17) 
3.  The 1920s lacked a proper system of coordination for achieving a stable set of 
exchange rates. “It was partly because of the lack of proper coordination 
during the stabilization period of the twenties that the system broke down in 
the thirties.” (117) In part this absence of coordination reflected the absence of 
a hegemonic power. Here Nurkse sketches out an argument later associated 
with Kindleberger: “The gold exchange standard suffered from the 
coexistence of at least two centres. Shifts of reserves from one centre to 
another gave rise to gold movements, and the liquidity of each centre was 
therefore liable to strains.” (217) 
4.  In the 1930s, countries engaged in competitive devaluations in part to get trade 
advantages (beggar-thy-neighbor policies), but in large part also because the   11
exchange rates were driven by “speculative capital movements.” The countries 
concerned did not really want widely fluctuating rates, but there was no 
alternative: “the level at which official controls stepped in to steady the 
exchange by one means or another was often reached in quite abnormal 
conditions.” (123) 
5.  The frequency of exchange adjustments was a major cause of the destruction 
of the international trading system. “The more frequent the exchange 
adjustments, the stronger are likely to be the disequilibriating tendencies not 
only in the capital flow but also in the movement of trade; the more frequent 
and disturbing will be the internal shifts of labour and other resources; the 
more seriously will exchange risks hamper foreign trade.” (141) 
6.  In the interwar system, international monetary policy had been increasingly set 
to conform with domestic objectives, in particular attempting to deal with the 
problem of unemployment, but this had produced the destabilizing 
depreciations and capital flows. A postwar monetary order would thus have to 
“find a system of international currency regulations compatible with the 
requirements of domestic stability.” (230) 
7.  Nurkse drew from these analyses the conclusion that first, initial exchange 
rates in “the establishment of an initial system should be made by mutual 
consultation and agreement”, and second, that subsequent alterations should 
be as rare as possible, but should not be impossible. They “should not be 
altered by arbitrary unilateral action.” (141) “Changes in exchange rates are   12
likely to be the more effective the less frequently they occur. Exchange 
stability should be the norm and exchange adjustment the exception.” (225) 
It is striking that there is one continuous villain, which explains why cumulative 
depreciation got under way in the early 1920s, why stabilization took place at the wrong 
levels, and why competitive devaluations wracked the 1930s. That villain is the 
movement of capital. There seems to have been a general consensus among the League 
economists in this issue. The director of the EFO Alexander Loveday, explained that 
“international lending was a bad method of combating economic depressions. When 
times were bad, the default which eventually ensued intensified the existing depression 
and led to currency depreciation.” He recommended a negative attitude on this point and 
personally preferred the export of capital on an equity, not on a bond basis.
5 
  The argument expounded by Nurkse relies heavily on the idea that hot money 
flows, which had in particular been a concomitant of political crises in the 1930s and 
which were thus thought to undermine democracy and international peace as well as 
international economic relations, were triggered primarily by expectations of exchange 
rate movements. Nurkse uses a quotation to hammer his point home: “When … national 
policies cease to regard the maintenance of exchange stability as something which must 
take precedence over all other considerations, … speculation regarding the probable 
movement of the exchanges, and capital movements in connection with such speculation, 
are normal and inevitable” (131). This quotation is from Gottfried Haberler’s Prosperity 
and Depression (431). But Haberler’s analysis really runs in a quite different direction. 
                                                 
5 LoN R4453, June 30, 1938, Minutes of Delegation on Economic Depressions.   13
Section 3. Gottfried Haberler and the International Transmission of Business Cycles 
 
Gottfried von Haberler, born in Purkersdorf, Austria in 1900 was one of the 
leading members of the Austrian School of Economics. He studied at the University of 
Vienna in the early 1920’s under Friederich von Wieser and Ludwig von Mises, and was 
a classmate of Friederich von Hayek, Oskar Morgenstern and Fritz Machlup. After 
receiving  doctorates in Law(1923) and in Economics (1925), he spent two years studying 
in the United States and Great Britain under a Rockefeller Foundation grant. He returned 
to Vienna and taught there from 1928-1936. During that period he was also a Visiting 
Professor of Economics at Harvard (1931-1932) and held an appointment with the 
League of Nations in Geneva (1934-1936) that led to the publication of Prosperity and 
Depression. in  1937. Haberler moved to the United States in 1936 and became Professor 
of Economics at Harvard University where he remained until retirement in 1971. He 
spent the rest of his life (1971-1995) as Senior Scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute in Washington D.C.
6 
  Haberler’s major  contributions to economics were in the study of business cycles, 
the subject of this paper,
7 in the theory of index numbers, and in the theory of 
international trade.
8 
  Gottfried von Haberler’s book Prosperity and Depression began as a short (47 
pages) brochure produced as part of a major inquiry commissioned by the League of 
                                                 
6 See Chipman (1987) and Ebeling (2000). 
7 He is credited with first discussing the real balance effect in the 1941 edition of  Prosperity and 
Depression as a way to avoid price level indeterminancy in the Keynesian model. 
8 According to Chipman(1987, p. 581) “his most significant contribution was his reformulation of the theory 
of comparative costs which revolutionized the theory of trade “.   14
Nations, and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation,  into the “Causes of Recurrence of 
Periods of Economic Depression”.  It was circulated in August 1934, with an invitation to 
comment, to a substantial number of prominent economists, under the title “Analysis of 
the Theories of the Business Cycle”.  This paper included only a few introductory and 
general comments on international aspects of the business cycle, arguing that cycles had 
become international as a consequence of increased international interconnectedness.  In 
particular, cycles might be linked through: 
1.  Changes in demand and supply of particular commodities. 
2.   Movements of capital.  Haberler added the comment: “Here again it is not a priori 
clear that the influence is such that prosperity in country A tends to create 
prosperity in B, and depression in A depression in B.  It is conceivable that 
prosperity in A draws upon the capital supply of B and has therefore an adverse 
influence on B.” 
3.  The international money mechanism (“the most important vehicle of prosperity 
and depression from country to country, the most powerful force which tends to 
bring about far-reaching mutual adjustment of the cyclical movement in various 
countries”).  Haberler noted: “Countries which have adopted the same standard of 
value (which are on the gold standard), or, more generally speaking, have adopted 
the policy of keeping the exchange rate fixed (exactly or approximately), are 
bound to move in the same direction as far as expansion and contraction in the 
circulating medium is concerned.  An expansion in one country will ease the   15
monetary situation in another and will tend to drag it along in the same 
direction.”
9 
  There is here no consideration of the role of monetary policy, and the whole 
passage is in fact rather unsatisfactory.  Very few of the comments supplied by the 
economists took on this aspect of the paper, and most concentrated on the discussion of 
domestic anti-cyclical policies, the treatment of Keynes, and the relationship between 
saving and investment (and the problematical definition of these terms, which Haberler 
used in a different sense than did Keynes). Only Alec Macfie wrote to Haberler to ask for 
more on the international side: “It seems to me that your work will be most valuable if it 
concentrates on the international aspects of the system.  We in Britain feel, I think, that if 
the cycles were a purely internal matter, then our banking system could control it.”
10 
  The book manuscript of Prosperity and Depression, which developed on the basis 
of the 1934 paper, was circulated to a smaller circle of economists: D.H. Robertson, 
Tinbergen, Robbins, Morgenstern, Bresciani-Turroni, Dupriez, Rist, Ohlin, Hansen, J.M. 
Clark, and Oskar Anderson.
11  
 
3.1 International Business Cycles under Fixed Exchange Rates 
 
In  Prosperity and Depression, (1937 and subsequent editions), chapter 12, 
Haberler analyzed the international characteristics of business cycles. His methodology 
was to start with the assumption that the world consisted of  sovereign nation states that 
                                                 
9  League of Nations archive, Geneva, R4539, Haberler, Systematic Analysis of the Theories of Business 
Cycles (August 1934, Economic Intelligence Service), p. 3.  
10  LoN R4539, Jan. 5, 1935, Alec. Macfie to Haberler.   16
used a common currency and that there were no impediments to the movement of goods 
and factors of production. From that simple perspective he then introduced ,one by one, 
the real world complications of tariffs and transportation costs; impediments to capital 
mobility; and national currencies and alternative monetary standards. Within each of 
these categories he then analyzed the international transmission  of shocks ( both real and  
monetary). 
        We  focus on the role of monetary standards.
12 Haberler (425-427) analyzes 
international transmission first treating the world as a unified currency area ( using gold 
coins as currency with bank  money convertible into coin) without and then with national 
central banks (such as the present day European Union). Without impediments to capital 
mobility, transmission of real shocks occurs via gold flows amplified by capital flows. 
Central banks have no scope for neutralization. The only role for an independent 
monetary policy is “ if credit is localized” (428). Under this circumstance central banks 
can temporarily sterilize gold flows but they are limited by the size of their gold reserves 
in the case of an outflow, and the stock of government securities in the case of an inflow. 
Next Haberler assumes a world close to the classical gold standard in which each 
country has its own national currency fully convertible into gold (430). The analysis of 
transmission and insulation is the same as that of the unified currency area. However here 
he introduces the possibility of destabilizing capital flows, if the commitment to gold is 
not completely credible.” [t]he mere anticipation or apprehension of exchange rate 
variations will suffice to give rise to speculative movements of capital from one currency 
to another”(430). Indeed here he clearly distinguishes between stabilizing short-term 
                                                                                                                                                 
11  LoN R4539, Feb. 10, 1936, Loveday note.   17
capital movements “if it is believed that no change will take place in the exchange rate”
13 
and destabilizing speculation in the case where  
 
“the adverse development of A’s balance on  trading  account  is  expected  to  be 
sufficiently considerable   and sufficiently lasting to cause a transfer of gold from 
A to B on such a scale as  to  lead to the abandonment of the gold standard  by  A. 
There will be a flight   from A’s currency to B’s which will  accentuate  the   gold  
export  and  either  advance the day when the gold standard must be abandoned or 
force  A to a more severe deflation    than    would    otherwise    be   necessary  ...  
Anticipations    regarding movements in the foreign exchanges tend  to  their  own 
fulfillment.” ( 431) 
 
3.2 International Business Cycles under Floating Exchange Rates 
 
The  fixed exchange rate standard is then compared to a world of freely floating 
exchange rates. Before  analyzing a free float, Haberler considers devaluation from a 
fixed exchange rate as a deliberate policy action. Two cases are distinguished. The stable 
case  where it is believed that the devaluation is expected to be permanent, and the 
unstable case where it is believed that the devaluation is insufficient to restore balance of 
payments equilibrium. In the former case, a devaluation will be successful in improving 
the balance of trade and raising  the level of income based on the implicit assumption that 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Also see Willett(1982) who covers some of the same ground. 
13 His analysis is close to the recent literature that views the classical gold standard as a form of credible 
target zone. See Hallwood, Marsh and MacDonald (1996) and Bordo and MacDonald (1997).   18
the demands for both imports and exports are elastic.
14 Moreover capital inflows will 
speed up the adjustment. Opposite effects will occur in appreciating countries. The net 
effect for the world as a whole depends on whether the devaluation  “ corrects an 
overvaluation” of the depreciated,and an “undervaluation” of the appreciated currency.” 
(439) 
            In the second case, which Haberler (436) and also Haberler (1936,44) believes is 
much closer to the interwar experience, a devaluation which is not believed to be 
sufficient to restore equilibrium will lead to capital flight and to instability in the 
exchange markets. In this case capital flows will  have  a deflationary effect on the  world 
as a whole. (440) 
             Haberler (441-451) then turns to the case of floating exchange rates (“free 
floats”). Although he states that “it is not suggested that such a system  has ever existed in 
a pure form” (411) , he views the  analysis of business cycles under floating as valuable 
because of the contrast with the gold standard. Under a free float, equilibrium in the 
balance of payments is maintained by variation in the exchange rate whereas under the 
gold standard equilibrium requires gold flows. ( 442) 
           Haberler compares the transmission of real shocks ( a change in tastes or a change 
in investment demand) under floating and under  the gold standard, in  the case where 
capital is immobile ( 443). If there is a shift of demand from country A’s products to  
those of country B, the following occurs under floating: the value of A’s currency falls 
relative to that in B. Assuming elastic demands for exports and imports,  the exchange 
                                                 
14 In Haberler(1949) a strong case is made against” elasticity pessimism”.   19
rate completely equilibrates the balance of trade. This is compared to a gold standard 
where  a gold flow is required to  restore equilibrium. 
 
    “ By reasoning not essentially different from the above, it can be shown  that,  under 
free exchanges without capital movements , there will be no tendency for prosperity  
    or depression to communicate  itself from country to country “ ( 446) 
 
and  after analyzing   the effect of an investment boom in country  B on country A he 
states  
 
     “ The  free-exchange system eliminates from the economic interchange  of  different 
countries the most important carrier of the boom and depression bacillus- namely the 
flow of money across frontiers.” 
 
Thus a key implication of Haberler’s analysis [although he didn’t state this at the time] is 
that floating exchange rates could  have prevented the international transmission of the 
Great Depression. 
          Haberler later qualifies his analysis of the insulation properties of floating rates. 
In a passage which nicely presages the analysis of Mundell (1963), he demonstrates that if 
capital is completely mobile that real shocks (such as an investment boom) will be 
internationally transmitted  as under the gold standard but that  changes in monetary 
policy can lead to perverse effects  on other countries. At the same time however    20
domestic monetary authorities  have the leeway to stimulate the economy unlike under the 
gold  standard. 
 
   “ Suppose that  a boom flares up in country D  because  new  investment  opportunities 
have appeared . If this attracts  foreign  capital,  the  expansionary  stimulus  is  at  once 
transmitted to the other ( capital exporting countries), while the expansion is hampered 
in the country D, where the stimulation first arose. If  on the other hand  the  expansion 
in D is brought about or fostered by a  cheap  money  policy  and  if  thereby  capital  is 
driven out of the country D(to take advantage of the  higher  interest  rates  abroad), the 
expansion in D is further intensified by  the   outward  capital  movement.  The  outside 
world instead of basking in the rays of prosperity cast by D, feels a  chilling wind  from 
that quarter and may even be thrown into a vicious spiral of  deflation” (449). 
 
Compare this analysis to that of Mundell (1963), and also Meade (1951) and 
Fleming(1962), where under floating exchange rates with perfect capital 
mobility,although a rise in the domestic money supply creates an incipient balance of 
payments deficit at home and surplus abroad leading to a depreciation of the home  
currency,the concomitant decline in interest rates induces a capital outflow which further 
depreciates the home currency. Demand for the home country’s goods is thereby 
stimulated and demand for the foreign country’s goods is reduced, raising  income at   21
home and reducing it abroad.
15 With capital mobility, monetary expansion at home leads 
to a recession abroad. 
          Under floating exchange rates, an increase in government expenditure in one 
country raises real expenditure including the demand for imports, hence depreciating the 
exchange rate. With capital mobility, however, the rise  in interest rates  induced by the 
increase in government  expenditure leads to a capital inflow, which offsets the effect of 
the current account imbalance on the exchange rate. At the same time , the capital outflow 
from the foreign country depreciates its exchange rate , stimulating the demand for its 








        A reading of Prosperity and Depression chapter 12 leads to a schizophrenic 
interpretation of Haberler’s views on floating rates. On the one hand, the quotation from 
page 431 that Nurkse used in his attack on them, gives the impression that Haberler 
himself was also very opposed. This is also echoed  in his earlier book The Theory of 
International Trade (1936) where he states: 
 
“ Both commercial  and financial relations  with  foreign  countries  are  at  once 
sensibly affected by  flutuations  of  the  exchanges.  Speculation  in  the  foreign 
exchange   market   develops,   unless   rates   are   kept   absolutely   stable,  and 
                                                 
15 The negative spillover effect is smaller the larger the domestic economy. 
16  This spillover effect diminishes the larger is the size of the domestic economy. 
17 See Bordo and Schwartz(1990).   22
international credit-operations of a normal kind are seriously hampered thereby.” 
(44) 
 
On the other hand, from a reading of the discussion of free floating from pages 441-451 
in Prosperity  and Depression  covered in section 3.2 above, Haberler succinctly analyzed  
the role that floating could provide as an insulator against international disturbances and 
as fostering the conditions for monetary independence. 
        Which Haberler are we to believe? The answer lies in the perception of the events of 
the interwar period that Haberler and his contemporaries all had—that departures from 
the gold standard occurred in the face of serious speculative attacks, that devaluations 
were almost always accompanied by capital flight, and the French experience with 
floating as a free-fall. They did not seriously consider the connection between unstable 
fiscal and monetary policies and unstable exchange rates or the possibility that stable 
financial policies could foster stable floating rates. 
       Haberler himself was strongly influenced by the events in central Europe that he had 
previously experienced. In The Theory of International Trade  he writes: 
 
“ In financially weak countries- particularly where the memory of inflation is  still 
fresh-  every  deviation  of  the  exchange  rate  from  gold   parity,   or   even   any 
likelihood of such deviation must lead to a crisis of confidence and to withdrawals 
of credit. This has been demonstrated once more by  events  in  Germany  in  1931 
and 1932.” 
   23
Yet he was also aware of the successful experience that England had with floating 
after September 1931: 
 
 “ Since departing,  in  September  1931,  from  the  gold  standard,  England  has 
followed  more  or  less  deliberately  and  with  the   support  of   many   English 
economists  a  policy  of  stabilizing  the  price  level .  This  policy  enabled   the 
Scandanavian countries and the Dominions to reap the advantages of stable rates 
with England-still the  center  of  world  trade- and  with  other  members  of  the 
sterling- group, and to maintain stability of prices relatively to one another.” (45)   
 
However, he goes on to say that 
 
  “ the instability of the exchange rate between the gold-standard and the  sterling-
currencies  has  led  to  serious  disadvantages.  The  conclusion  seems   therefore 
justified that stable exchange- rates, or in other words an international standard of 
one kind or another, is indispensable in the long-run  for  any  extensive  exchange 
of goods and credit on an individualistic basis “ (46) 
 
  Thus Haberler, like Nurkse, was a captive of the contemporary perception of the  
tumultuous events of his time. In Prosperity and Depression  his analysis led to the 
theoretical possibility that floating exchange rates could have cut short the international 
transmission of the Great Depression but he did not state this. Thus although Haberler   24
laid the intellectual ground work for the case for floating  it seems unlikely that he would 
have been its advocate before World War II.     
  Indeed in an article written at the end of World War II for a panel session of the 
American Economics Association considering post war policies, Habeler made a strong 
statement against floating  
 
“ … it is  certain  that  a  system  of  “free  exchanges”  would  lead  to  extremely 
undesirable results. It would incite capital flight  and  violent  fluctuations.  There 
are very few instances of really free exchanges in monetary history and none that 
could be called successful… such a free system would be even worse  this  time [ 
compared to the French case after  World War I] because people everywhere  are 
much more  inflation conscious than they were in  1919,  and  hence,  speculative  
reactions would be very quick “ (1945, 209) 
 
   In sum, although Haberler definitely presented a clear alternative to the adjustable 
peg with capital controls that the world adopted at Bretton Woods in 1944, it seems 
unlikely that he would have been the person to advocate it. 
 
4.  The Contemporary Response to Haberler 
 
 In Prosperity and Depression, Haberler intended to synthesize existing theory.   
Partly underlying this work of synthesis was an intention to demonstrate that Keynes was 
not as original as his supporters claimed, and there was thus an implicit polemic, which   25
the Keynesians recognized.  The Keynesians recognized this, and Richard Kahn 
complained in an Economic Journal review (1937, p. 677) of Haberler’s “basic 
ideology”; while Haberler’s best Cambridge contact was Dennis Robertson, who 
described himself as a “black sheep” in Cambridge because of his skepticism about the 
multiplier.
18  On the other hand, there was quite widespread recognition of the attraction 
of such a synthesis.  Arthur Burns responded to the 1934 paper with a “wish to 
congratulate you upon your success in showing that the differences among the various 
theories are far less important than is commonly assumed.”
19  The emerging Keynesian 
Roy Harrod spoke of the “idea of arbitration” and “conciliation” and added: “I myself 
have often advocated that something of this sort should be done in cases of disputes 
among economists.”
20 
  Partly, also, Haberler was instructed by the League’s Economic and Financial 
Organisation, and its influential director Alexander Loveday, to avoid polemics.  When in 
1939 Haberler revised Chapter 8 in an anti-Keynesian sense, Loveday rebuked him: “You 
give the impression of a valiant and war-scarred chieftain, gathering around him his plaid 
and his followers in order to make one fierce and final attack upon his adversaries.  This, 
I think, can be successful as a diplomatic form of procedure on the assumption that the 
adversaries are in fact decimated to a man.  But, alas, whatever the prospects of 
decimation may be, this is not a procedure that the League as a publisher can possibly 
contemplate.  We cannot enter into professorial politics.”
21  In fact the whole League 
                                                 
18  LoN R4539, April 16, 1936 Robertson to Keynes. 
19  LoN R4539, Dec. 27, 1934 Arthur F. Burns to Haberler. 
20  LoN R4539, Nov. 5, 1934 Harrod to Haberler. 
21  LoN R4540, Feb. 10, 1939, Loveday to Haberler.   26
project involved getting as many prominent economists as possible to argue and comment 
on each other’s work, and to produce what might be thought of as a new consensus. 
  It is striking how little commentary the international sections of the book 
occasioned in the mid-1930s: again all the discussion focused on the Keynesian 
discussion, and on Haberler’s use of time periods, and on whether Haberler was too 
Austrian (Einaudi wrote “Money seems to be the moving deity.  And so it is to a certain 
point.”).
22 
  Haberler continued to be central to a new League project, which fundamentally 
developed the study of Prosperity and Depression, which was adopted by the Council of 
the League in January 1938, “to conduct an enquiry into measures that might be deployed 
with a view to the prevention or mitigation of economic depressions.”   
This new project not only drew in the views of economists; every finance ministry 
and central bank in the member countries of the League were invited to make a statement.  
Commenting on the replies to this invitation, the League’s Economic and Financial 
Organisation concluded, “the most remarkable feature common to practically all 
Government replies is the absence of definite statements regarding the adoption of 
exchange depreciation as a deliberate measure of monetary policy.” (The only exception 
was Chile, whose central bank provided a quite definite statement:  
 
“A  policy which has as its conscious aim  not only  the  maintenance  of  relative 
stability in the purchasing power of the currency, but also greater stability in   the 
development of economic activity in general, can only achieve that aim provided   27
that the maintenance of a legally stable monetary parity is ruled out a priori,  and 
provided  that  the  Government  is  authorized   to   modify   the   parity   as   the 
circumstances of a given situation may advise of dictate.”)
23 
 
  This Chilean view was discarded as being eccentric, however; and in response to 
the big politically driven hot money movements of 1936-8 a new academic view was 
gradually formed, which Dennis Robertson summed up as “the deadliness of the weapon 
of competitive devaluation”. 
24 
  The project on prevention and mitigation of crises continued during the War, 
when the League’s Economic and Financial Organisation moved to Princeton.  Haberler, 
who had long before moved to the United States (to a professorship in Harvard), worked 
during the War at the NBER.  He continued to work with the project, and also quite 
closely followed a project conducted under the auspices of the League on lessons to be 
derived from interwar currency movements.  The chief author for this project (originally 
entitled “The total volume of international currency”) was Ragnar Nurkse, and Haberler 
maintained a regular correspondence with him, urging particular points (such as the 
correct view that the British pound was NOT over-valued between 1925 and 1931, a view 
ignored by Nurkse in the final publication).
25  In general, Haberler was extremely 
supportive, and at the end of December 1943 wrote on reading the introductory first 
chapter:  
                                                                                                                                                 
22  LoN R4539, Jan. 28, 1935, Einaudi to Haberler. 
23  LoN D.D.E., Sept. 5, 1938, statement of central bank of Chile; Nov. 11, 1938, Summary of Government 
Replies. 
24  LoN May 30, 1938 Robertson: Note on Measures to Promote Recovery from Depression. 
25 LoN C1738, Oct. 11, 1943, Haberler to Nurkse.   28
 
“It seems to me an excellent piece of work and I have literally no comments.  I am 
sure that the volume will arouse much interest and you  should  make  sure  that  a 




  But there was a substantial pressure on Nurkse to distance himself from the 
Haberler stance, and to come down very emphatically on the side of a fixed exchange rate 
regime as an answer to the ills of competitive devaluation.  That pressure came above all 
from a young Dutch economist, who had worked with the League in Geneva, and was 
now part of the Dutch government in exile (in the Economic, Financial and Shipping 
Mission of the Netherlands, in Washington D.C.), J.J. Polak.  Polak wrote to Nurkse 
emphasizing his criticism of the exchange rate section of  the draft: 
 
“That is that it is taking rather a wavering attitude with  regard  to  the  desirability 
of exchange rate depreciation.  I must say that I am personally rather in  sympathy 
with this uncertain attitude; it reflects in fact the  uncertainty  of  economic  theory 
concerning this issue.  However, for the benefit of the reader  you  might  consider 
to tip the scales further against depreciation,  provided  1)  adequate  measures  are 
taken to prevent depressions and 2) there is an international mechanism to provide 
foreign exchange when  required.   The  latter  provision  would  take  care  of  the 
balance of payments difficulties which depreciation is supposed to remedy.   [This   29
mechanism would be the IMF.] With respect  to  the  stimulation  of  employment, 
you might again insist upon investment policies rather than depreciation.” 
 
This is a remarkable argument (or non-argument) in the way that it admits the 
“uncertainty” of economic theory on  the exchange rate issue, but suggests that the 
“reader” would somehow benefit from a clearer stance against exchange rate movements.  
Indeed the influence of Haberler was to be excised: “Page 17, second paragraph, I would 
omit the six lines referring  to Haberler, since they are a) not relevant and b) not true (at 
least this is my strong suspicion).”
27 
  Polak reverted to this theme in subsequent correspondence with Nurkse.  In 
dealing with balance of payments adjustment, he said, “You know the objections I feel 
against Haberer’s [sic] treatment in ‘Prosperity and Depression’ and I think it would be a 
pity if the League would produce again a survey of this theoretical point which was long 
enough to pretend to be a standard treatment and which would yet not cover questions 
adequately.”
28  Fortified in this way, Nurkse proceeded to give an authoritative and 
scintillating account of the speculative ills associated with exchange rate movements. 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 LoN C1738, Dec. 21, 1943, Haberker to Nurkse. 
27 LoN C1738, Aug. 25, 1943, Polak to Nurkse. 
28 LoN C1738, April 13, 1944, Polak to Nurkse.   30
Section 5. Conclusion: Haberler a Belated Advocate of Floating 
 
Two decades after  The  Theory of International Trade and Prosperity and 
Depression  Haberler came out as a strong advocate  for floating exchange rates and he 
reversed a number  of the positions he had taken in the 1930s and 1940s.
29 In  Currency 
Convertibility (1954) , Haberler  makes the case that the European countries should 
remove their exchange controls and restore current account convertibility but not to the 
adjustable peg of the Bretton Woods  Articles. Instead they should adopt floating rates as 
had been done by Canada in 1950. The case that he makes against the adjustable peg is 
very similar to that of Milton Friedman (1953): 
 
“The system  of the  “ adjustable  peg’  under  which  there  are  occasional  sharp 
adjustments in the exchange rate of a currency while rates are rigidly pegged at  a 
constant level during the intervening period…  has  worked  in  an  unsatisfactory 
and in fact unstabilizing fashion.” (24) 
 
Like Friedman, Haberler criticizes the adjustable peg because the concept 
of”fundamental disequilibrium’- the criterion governing an adjustment in parity, is 
imprecise and monetary authorities “ to avoid the embarassment of having to repeat the 
operation will tend to devalue too much rather than too little. Therefore the method of the 
‘adjustable peg’ does not provide the necessary flexibility “ (24); it is highly vulnerable to 
speculative attack because speculators  can only win with a one way bet against the peg;   31
that “ it puts  responsible people in a  morally dubious position. Up to the last moment 
before they carry out their decision to depreciate they have to protest solemnly that they 
have no such intention…” (25)  As  prime examples of the flaws in the Bretton Woods 
system, he cites the British crises of 1947 and 1949. 
 
“‘When a currency is under pressure, as Sterling was in 1949, the   country  loses 
gold and dollar reserves and more and more people expect a  depreciation.  If  the 
currency is pegged, the risk of speculation against it is almost  entirely  removed, 
because the speculator can be virtually certain that the value of the currency  will 
not go up. If Great Britain had possessed a floating exchange, the dollar price  of 
Sterling would have drifted  down  earlier.  There  would  also  have  been  some  
speculation against Sterling. But soon a point would  have  been  reached  where 
some speculators would begin to expect recovery.” (25)
30 
 
  Moreover as a contrast to the 1947 and 1949 experiences and in a partial reversal 
of his  position in 1936, he praises the British float after 1931 as “ another highly 
successful experiment in freely floating exchange rates, and in another reversal of his 
earlier views, he states that “ persistent and massive speculation  against a currency “ 
capital flight” is invariably the consequences of inflation, policies , political instability or 
the threat of war” and not the consequence of floating [our emphasis] (24). 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 In the late 1960s, Hebeler headed a committee to advise the incoming Republican administration on 
international monetary issues, and at this time pushed the case for floating. 
30 This of course echoes the controversial ROBOT plan circulated in 1952 inside the British government, 
urging the authorities to float the pound, make it convertible into gold and dollars, and fund the sterling 
balances (see Cairncross 1985, ch. 9).   32
   Finally, like Friedman, Haberler argues that in normal cases, floating would 
involve few changes in exchange rates and that” the inconvenience of fluctuating rates 
can be substantially reduced by permitting and organizing well functioning forward 
markets in foreign exchange “ (26) 
  Two decades later, Haberler revisited the scene of the crime-the interwar period. 
In “The World Economy,Money and the Great Depression “ (1976), Haberler clearly 
states that floating rates were not to blame for the instability of that era.. He is highly 
critical of the Nurkse view that intertwined floating exchange rates with competitive 
devaluations as important causes of world depression. 
 
  “There has been general agreement  that  competitive  depreciation  of  currencies 
greatly contributed to the world depression. This agreement found  its  expression 
in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund…  But  the  IMF 
charter does not define the term. It is indeed an imprecise term and there has been 
much confusion about its meaning and causes. Competitive depreciation has been 
and often still  is  attributed  to  floating…  Some  regard  the  mere  existence  of 
exchange-rate changes in the 1930s as evidence of competitive depreciation. This 
completely confuses the problem. Not  every  devaluation  was  of  a  competitive 
kind. A devaluation which merely  restores  equilibrium  or  “clean  “ unmanaged 
floats…  has  nothing  to  do  with  competitive  devaluation”  (385)   Indeed   the 
deflation and devolution of trade in the 1930’s reflected the perverse operation of 
“an adjustable peg with excessive rigidity “ (387) 
   33
  Haberler describes the events of the 1930’s as follows: 
 
“The depreciation of the pound came in 1931,of the dollar in 1933-34,of  the  gold 
bloc currencies in  1936… In between the big changes, there was some movement 
of exchange rates, but  very  little  free  floating.  Most  of  the  devaluations  were 
forced by  acute balance of payments pressures intensified by massive speculation 
and  could  be  justified  as  necessary  conditions  for   domestic   expansion   and 
relaxation of import restrictions. But each of these  devaluations  put  deflationary 
pressure on all the other  countries  that  maintained  their  gold  parities,  pushing 
them  deeper  into  depression import  restrictions,  and  exchange   control.   This 
vicious sequence, [which ] became known as “ competitive  depreciation”…  was 
attributed  to  floating,  but  in  reality  it  was  the  consequence  of  overly   rigid 
exchange rates- in  other  words,  of  the  refusal  to  make  adjustments  until  the 
situation became critical “ ( 375) 
 
  Thus “ the major misinterpretation of the lessons was blaming the competitive 
depreciations of the 1930”s on flexible exchange rates rather than an excessive rigidity of 
those rates and on the defects of the method of the adjustable peg. As a consequence 
floating was ruled out.” (390) 
   Haberler (1976) largely attributes the Great Depression to monetary forces and 
specifically, following Friedman and Schwartz(1963) to the monetary collapse in the 
United States.  “ … there can be no doubt that the collapse of the banking system, the 
bankruptcy of many thousand banks, and the inept and overly timid monetary policies   34
which permitted the money stock to shrink by about one-third was to a large extent 
responsible for the disaster “ (384)  The monetary collapse in the US. was then 
transmitted via the  fixed exchange rate gold standard to the rest of the world. 
“ The overwhelming importance of the monetary factor is underlined by the fact that 
countries that applied expansionary measures under the cover of open or disguised 
devaluation or of floating  managed to extricate themselves from the maelstrom of 
deflation one or two years ahead of the United States “ ( 385)
31  
   Haberler is critical of the Nurkse view, which he had also endorsed earlier,
32 that 
the international depression could have been avoided “ if the leading industrial nations 
had initiated… a simultaneous policy of monetary expansion, in say, the spring of 1931… 
“ (Nurkse, 1944,130). According to Haberler “ the conditions needed for there to be 
sufficient policy coordination to  obviate exchange rate changes are very exacting- so 
exacting indeed that they are unlikely to be generally fulfilled between sovereign 
countries.”  Haberler (1976)’s  preferred solution is exactly the one implied by Haberler 
(1937)’s  pages 441-451 discussion that the spread of the Great Depression could have 
been avoided by floating rates. 
 
   “Given  the American depression and given  the  impossibility  of  an  across    the 
board change in gold parities, the best  method  of  currency  realignment    would 
have been extensive floating. If in September 1931 Germany and  the  gold    bloc 
countries, following the British example, had depreciated their currencies  against 
the dollar and started expansionary  policies,  they  all  could  have  cut  short   the   35
deflationary spiral in their countries, just as the devaluation of the pound cut short 
the deflationary spiral for the sterling bloc.   This  would  have  course  intensified 
the  US  depression,  but  it  might   have   induced   the   United   States   to   take 
expansionary measures. “ (377)
33 
 
   Thus it took Haberler 40 years to fully make the case for floating exchange rates 
as the cure for the “bacillus” of the international spread of depressions, that his analysis in 
Prosperity and Depression suggested. Had he followed through at the time one wonders 
if the international monetary system would have evolved  differently? Given the 
opposition to his analysis by most contemporaries it seems doubtful. 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 For evidence see Bernanke and James (1991). 
32 And the view of Eichengreen (1992). 
33 Haberler (1976) footnote 29 also argued that the U.S. could have taken the required expansionary 
monetary policy to offset the deflation without being hampered by a balance of payments constraint. For 
recent supporting evidence see Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1999) and Hsieh and Romer (2001).   36
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